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THE COMPENSATING INCOME VARIATION 





There is a small but growing literature on the determinants of social capital. Most of these 
studies use a measure of trust to define social capital empirically. In this paper we use three 
different measures of social capital: the size of the individual’s social network, the extent of 
their social safety net and membership of unions or associations. A second contribution to the 
literature is that we analyze what social capital contributes to our well-being. Based on this, 
we calculate the compensating income variation of social capital. We find differences in 
social capital when we differentiate according to individual characteristics such as education, 
age, place of residence, household composition, and health. Household income generally has 
a statistically significant effect. We find a significant effect of social capital on life 
satisfaction. Consequently, the compensating income variation of social capital is substantial. 
JEL Code: D1, D6. 
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Introduction 
 
Increased individualism and higher mobility have changed the nature of family and 
community life. The most profound change has been the shortening of the length of 
relationships:  a  higher  divorce  rate  has  led  to  a  shortening  of  the  duration  of 
marriages, higher job mobility led to a shortening of the employment relationship, the 
increased  availability  and the  lowering  of  the  costs  of transportation  has  led  to a 
higher  geographical  mobility  and  to  a  loosening  of  the  attachment  to  the 
neighborhood.  
The more individualized society has become, the more interested we have got 
in  what  people  binds  and  holds  society  together,  and  the  mechanisms  that 
accomplish this. This has led to a re-appraisal of the value of social relations. Social 
capital includes all factors that foster social relations and social cohesion. In recent 
years a small body of literature has emerged that emphasizes the value of social 
capital and warns that diminished social capital leads to an erosion of social cohesion 
(see  Bourdieu  1986,  Arrow  1999,  Putnam  1995,  2000,  Fukuyama  1995,  1999, 
Helliwell & Putnam 1999, Solow 1999 and Woolcock 2000. For a critical discussion of 
the concept of social capital, see Durlauf 1999, 2002, Durlauf & Fafchamps 2004 and 
Sobel 2000).  
In this paper we contribute to the literature on social capital by analyzing the 
determinants and the value of three aspects of social capital: the size of the social 
network (how many people you interact with in your neighborhood), the extent of the 
social safety net (i.e. the extent to which one can call on others when necessary), 
and the membership of unions and associations. 
   2 
Social capital is supposed to have an important economic value. The World Bank 
argues that: “Increasing evidence shows that social cohesion is critical for societies 
to prosper economically and for development to be sustainable. Social capital is not 
just the sum of the institutions which underpin a society – it is the glue that holds 
them together” (http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/).  
In many studies social capital is operationalized as the extent to which people 
trust their fellow men (see Glaeser et. al 1999, 2000, 2000a, Alesina & La Ferrara 
2000, Knack & Keefer 1997, La Porta et. al 1997). Most of these studies find that 
trust is related to education: higher educated people are more likely to put trust in 
others than lower educated people. People with higher educated parents are also 
more likely to be trustful. Further, men, people who are married and people with a 
strong religious conviction are more likely to trust other people. Alesina & La Ferrara 
(2000) find that the most important factors that lead to having less trust in others are: 
traumatic experiences in the past, belonging to a group that believes they have been 
discriminated  (blacks,  women),  being  economically  not  successful,  and  living  in  a 
neighborhood  with  people  from  different  ethnic  origins  and/or  with  large  income 
differences.  
A second way in which social capital is operationalized in the literature is by 
membership of clubs or groups such as unions, church, sports clubs, reading clubs, 
etc..  Glaeser  et.  al.  (2000b)  find  a  positive  relation  between  education  and 
membership of an association. They conclude from this that human capital and social 
capital are complements. This study further finds that membership of an association 
is inverse U-shaped in age (like investments in human capital), and that a higher 
geographical  mobility  reduces  the  probability  of  membership  of  an  association. 
Workers in occupations that require social skills are more likely to join a club. The   3 
probability to be a member of a club is also higher if one is a house-owner and if the 
commuting time to work is shorter.   
 
Our paper differs from previous studies on social capital in two respects. First, we 
use  a  different  measure  of  social  capital.  Previous  studies  have  mainly  used  a 
question on trust in other people to operationalize social capital. In this paper we 
define social capital by the size of the social network (i.e. the number of households 
in the neighborhood with whom one has contacts), the extent of the social safety net 
(i.e. the extent to which one can call upon people when necessary) and membership 
of  unions  or  associations.  We  analyze  what  determines  these  aspects  of  social 
capital.  
After we have operationally defined social capital and we have analyzed the 
determinants of our three social capital indicators, the main question we address is 
how  social  capital  contributes  to  individual  well-being  or  happiness?  We  use  the 
outcome of the analyses of the effects of our three social capital indicators on life 
satisfaction to estimate the monetary equivalent of the benefits of social capital. The 
social  capital  effects  on  life  satisfaction  are  used  to  calculate  the  compensating 
income  variation  of  the  three  dimensions  of  social  capital  distinguished,  i.e.  the 
amount of money that compensates for a change in each of the three dimensions of 
social capital while keeping the level of well-being constant. 
 
Well-being or life satisfaction is measured by the response to the so-called Cantril 
scale.  This  measures  life  satisfaction  on  a  0  to  10  scale:  steps  on  the  so-called 
ladder of life. This measure of life satisfaction is also referred to in the literature as 
the Self-Anchoring Striving Scale (SASS). The Cantril scale has been shown to have   4 
adequate reliability and validity (see Beckie & Hayduk 1997 and McIntosh 2001). 
According  to  Diener  &  Suh  (1999,  p.  437),    ‘When  self-reports  of  well-being  are 
correlated  with  other  methods  of  measurement,  they  show  adequate  convergent 
validity.’ Diener & Suh (1997) assert that the major advantage of the subjective well-
being  measures  is  ‘(...)  That  they  capture  experiences  that  are  important  to  the 
individual’ (p. 205). As a major disadvantage they note that ‘although self-reported 
measures of well-being have adequate validity and reliability, it is naive to assume 
that every individual’s responses are totally valid and accurate’ (p. 206). Their review 
further shows that there is a high correlation between life satisfaction and a social 
index that includes cost of living, ecology, health, culture and entertainment, freedom 
and  infrastructure  indicators.  Diener  &  Shuh  (1997,  1999)  further  assert  that  life 
satisfaction measures are found to be stable over time and across countries.
1        
Measures of subjective well-being - such as the Cantril scale - are widely used 
in psychology and social sciences, but not so much in economics. There are some 
notable  exceptions,  however  (see,  for  example  Groot  &  Maassen  van  den  Brink 







                                                 
     
1 Diener & Shuh (1999) report that the average Pearson correlation between mean levels 
of subjective well-being reported for nations in three different international surveys is 0.71. 
An  overview  of  average  levels  of  well-being  in  forty-one  nations  shows  that  average  life 
satisfaction in 1994 ranged from 5.03 in Bulgaria to 8.39 in Switzerland (Diener & Shuh 1999, 
p. 436).   5 
The empirical model 
 
The starting point of the empirical model is the life satisfaction or happiness function 
(U
*). It is assumed that life satisfaction is determined by income Y, social capital SC 
and other individual characteristics X: 
 
where  Y  is  the  net  (monthly)  household  income. We  distinguish  three  aspects  of 
social capital: the size of the social network (SC1), the extent to which one can call 
on others when necessary (SC2), and membership of a union of association (SC3). 
We assume the following relationship between social capital and life satisfaction:  
 
where β are coefficients that measure the impact of income, social capital and other 
characteristics on life satisfaction, and ε is a normally distributed random error term 
capturing  unmeasured  and  unmeasurable  effects  on  life-satisfaction.  The  Log  of 
income is used instead of income itself following other authors (see e.g. Diener 1984, 
Veenhoven 1996 and Groot & Maassen van den Brink 2000).  
 
Quality of life or life satisfaction is a latent variable that is not directly observable. 
What we observe is the response to a question on life-satisfaction in general. We 
dispose in our data set of the observed level of life-satisfaction U
o as a categorically 
)   X    SC, Y,   (   U   =   U
* *     (1) 
0 1 2 3 Log 1 2 3
*
y X  =     (Y) +   SC  +   SC  +   SC  +   X +  + U ε β β β β β β   (2)   6 
ordered  response  variable.  Response  classes  are  ordered  0,…,10.  The  observed 
life-satisfaction variable is assumed to be related to the latent happiness variable in 
the following way: 
 
 
where  n  is  the  number  of  response  categories  and  αi  are  threshold  levels.  This 
equation  states  that  if  happiness  U
*  is  between  αi-1  and  αi,  the  response  to  the 
question of life satisfaction is equal to i (U
o  = i). We assume that the lower bound of 
the observed life-satisfaction variable corresponds with the lowest possible level of 
happiness,  while  the  upper  bound  of  the  observed  life-satisfaction  variable 
corresponds  to  the  highest  possible  happiness  level  that  can  be  attained.  This 
amounts to the assumption that life-satisfaction can range from -∞ (minus infinity) to 
∞ (infinity). We therefore set α0 = -∞ and αn = ∞. The remaining  n-1 threshold levels 
are  estimated.  This  is  the  specification  of  the  well-known  ordered  Probit-model 
(McKelvey & Zavoina 1975). 
 
The parameter estimates are used to calculate the compensating income variation of 
social capital, i.e. the income increase  needed to make someone with limited social 
capital as well off as someone with more social capital. Let C(X; U, SCi1) represent 
the  income  necessary  for  an  individual  with  social  capital  level  SCi1  and 
characteristics X to attain life satisfaction level U, and let C(X; U, SCi0) represent the 
income necessary for an individual with the same characteristics X with social capital 
SCi0 to attain the same level of life satisfaction (i refers to the three indicators of 
n 1,...., = i          U   <      if    i   =   U i
*
1 - i
o α α ≤     (3)   7 
social  capital,  i.e.  i  =  1,2,3).  The  equivalence  scale  of  social  capital  ES  is  then 
defined as: 
 
Taking logs and substituting the expression for the cost function derived from the life 
satisfaction function, we obtain: 
 
where   SC = SCi1 – SCi0.  
 
In order to assess the monetary value of the size of the social network and the extent 
of the social safety net, we calculate the ES of one higher point score on the aspects 
of social capital - i.e. SCi1 = SCi0 + 1 - for each individual in our sample separately. 
For membership of an association, we compare between being a member and not 
being a member. Next, we calculate the aggregate compensating income variation 
(CV)  of  social  capital  by  multiplying  the  ES  by  the  average  monthly  household 
income of the individuals in our sample. 
 
. 
) SC   U,   (X;   C
) SC   U,   (X;   C
  =   ES
i0
i1  
0 1 Log Log Log
i
y
 ES =   C (X; U,  ) -   C (X; U, SC ) = SC
 
     SC
β
β
∆    8 
Data and descriptive analysis 
 
The data for the empirical analysis are taken from the GPD-survey 2002. This data 
set is collected in a somewhat unorthodox way as a survey in Dutch dailies. The 
response on this anonymous survey without reminders, etc. is relatively low at about 
2%,  but,  since  the  total  readership  exceeds  two  million  subscribers,  the  absolute 
number of about 40,000 is extremely high. Similar surveys have been carried out in 
1983,’84,’91,’98. The experiences with this survey are very good.  We notice that the 
survey is not completely representative for the Dutch population, as ethnic minorities 
and non-readers of daily news are hardly represented. For the core of the Dutch 
population the surveys appear to be representative after usual reweighting. But, we 
should  keep  in  mind  that  for  our  objectives  representativity  is  relatively  less 
important, as we try to estimate relationships in the first place. It is obvious that in 
order to assess aggregate numbers over the population we have to reweigh as best 
as possible. 
 
We use three indicators of social capital. The first is the size of the social network 
(SC1). The size of the social network is determined by the response to the following 
survey question: “With how many households or families in your neighborhood do 
you  associate  with?”.  The  second  indicator  is  the  extent  of  the  social  safety  net 
people have (SC2). The extent of the social safety net is determined by the response 
to the question: “Are there people you can fall back on when you are ill or you have 
problems? Can you fall back on: a) neighbors, b) children, c) family members, d) 
friends and e) others.” For each of these five categories of people respondents can   9 
indicate  whether  they  could  fall  back  on  them  1=never,  2=with  some  effort, 
3=possible, 4=always. 
Finally, we use the question “Are you a member of a trade union or special 
interest group (consumer organization, association of home owners, etc.)?” (SC3) as 
an indicator of social capital, where 0 stands for ‘no’ and 1 for ‘yes’. 
 
Table  1  contains  the  frequency  distribution  of  the  number  of  households  in  the 
neighborhood with whom one has contacts. A little over a third of the respondents 
has contacts with one or two households in the neighborhood, while a little less than 
a third has contacts with 5 households or more. On average people have contacts 
with 3.3 households in the neighborhood. There is little difference in the frequency 
distribution of the size of the social network in the neighborhood between men and 
women in our sample. 
 
 
Table 1 Frequency distribution social network: “with how many households 
or families in your neighbourhood do you associate with?” (number of 
observations in brackets) 
  1  2  3  4  5 or more  Mean 
All  11.93  22.92  18.68  14.98  31.48  3.31 
(N=13209) 
Men  11.12  22.54  18.4  15.09  32.85  3.36 
(N=7808) 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   11 
The questions about the social safety net refer to the extent to which one can call 
upon children, family, friends or others when necessary. Respondents are asked to 
indicate for all four of these on a scale from 1 (never) to 4 (always) whether one can 
call  on  them.  The  sum  score  of  the  answers  to  these  questions  is  used  in  the 
analyses. The sum score of the social safety net runs from 5 for respondents who 
indicated ‘never’ on all questions to 20 for people who can always rely on all of the 
four groups distinguished.   
  Table 2 has the frequency distribution of the social safety net scale. Only 0.6% 
of all respondents say ‘never’ to all five items in the scale, while only 3.8% respond 
‘always’  to  all  items.  The  average  score  on  the  social  safety  net  scale  is  14.2. 
Converted to the four point scale, this most closely corresponds to ‘possible’ on the 
scale from ‘never’ to ‘always’ on the social safety net. Again we find little difference in 
the  frequency  distribution  and  the  average  score  on  the  social  safety  net  scale 
between men and women. 
 
The  third  indicator  of  social  capital  is  a  dummy  variable  that  equals  one  if  the 
respondent is a member of at least one trade union or special interest association 
and  equals  zero  otherwise.  Table  3  contains  the  frequency  distribution  of  the 
membership variable. About 43% of the respondents is member of a union or special 
interest group. Here we do find a difference between men and women: men are more 
likely to be a member than women. More than 48% of the men is member of a union 
or interest group. Among women 36.5% has joined a union or interest group.   12 
 
Table 3 Frequency distribution membership of union or association 
(number of observations in brackets) 
  Respondent is 
member 
Respondent is not 
a member 
Mean  
All  43.99  56.01  0.439 (N=14584) 
Men  48.23  51.77  0.482 (N=9340) 
Women  36.51  63.49  0.365 (N=5232) 
 
 
The three indicators of social capital are included in the life satisfaction equation. The 
level of life satisfaction is measured by the so-called Cantril (1965) scale. The life 
satisfaction  question  is  phrased  as  follows:  ‘Here  is  a  picture  of  a  ladder, 
representing the ladder of life. The bottom of this ladder, step 0, represents the worst 
possible life, while the top of this ladder, step 10, represents the best possible life. 
Where on this ladder do you feel you personally stand at present?’ 
Table 4 contains the frequency distribution of life satisfaction. About 4% of the 
respondents rate their life 5 or less. A similar number of people (3.6%) give their life 
the highest possible value, a 10. Most people rate their life at 7 or 8. The average 














































































































































































































































































































































The determinants of social participation  
 
Table 5 contains the estimation results of a OLS regression on the log-size of the 
social network. The OLS estimates on the log-extent of one’s social safety net and 
the probit estimates on membership of a trade union or association are found in table 
6 and 7, respectively. 
  There are no statistically significant differences between men and women in 
the  size  of  the  social  network  and  the  extent  of  the  social  safety  net.  The  only 
difference we find is for membership of a union or association: men are more likely to 
be a member than women. This difference may be due to differences in the labor 
force participation rate of men and women: men are more likely to participate in the 
labor market and are - partly because of this - more frequently member of a trade 
union. 
 
Having a paid job is negatively associated with the (log of the) size of the social 
network and positively with log of the social safety net scale and the probability of 
being a member of a union or association. Only among men, having a paid job does 
not have a statistically significant effect on the size of the social network. Among 
women  the  point  estimates  indicate  that  being  employed  reduces  the  size  of  the 
social network by nearly 11%. The explanation for this finding is that people with a 
paid  job  probably  have  less  time  to  invest  in  relations  with  people  in  their 
neighborhood.   15 
 
Table 5 Parameter estimations OLS model log social network (standard errors 
in brackets)  
  All  Men  Women 
Gender  0.018 (0.011)     
Employed  -0.055** (0.014)  -0.015 (0.018)  -0.108** (0.021) 
Years of education  0.006** (0.002)  0.006* (0.002)  0.008* (0.004) 
Log Age squared  0.037 (0.037)  0.045 (0.042)  0.095 (0.090) 
Log Age  -0.183 (0.280)  -0.223 (0.311)  -0.609 (0.670) 
City   -0.074** (0.012)  -0.074** (0.015)  -0.070** (0.020) 
Municipality  -0.008 (0.004)  -0.005 (0.005)  -0.014 (0.007) 
Years in house  0.001** (0.000)  0.001* (0.001)  0.001 (0.001) 
Living together  0.051** (0.014)  0.039* (0.019)  0.067** (0.021) 
Child aged < 4  0.126** (0.019)  0.138** (0.024)  0.106** (0.030) 
Child aged 4 - 12  0.002 (0.017)  0.005 (0.022)  -0.003 (0.028) 
Child aged 12 - 18  -0.026 (0.019)  -0.036 (0.024)  -0.011 (0.031) 
Child aged > 18  -0.078** (0.017)  -0.059** (0.022)  -0.106** (0.027) 
Log household income  0.001 (0.008)  -0.005 (0.010)  0.010 (0.014) 
Ethnic minority  -0.002 (0.028)  -0.003 (0.036)  0.000 (0.045) 
Conservative  0.042** (0.010)  0.043** (0.012)  0.041* (0.017) 
Health  0.015** (0.005)  0.007 (0.006)  0.027** (0.008) 
Intercept  1.535** (0.525)  1.632** (0.590)  2.223 (1.239) 
       
Adjusted R
2  0.036  0.026  0.053 
Number of observations  9480  6205  3275 
 
 
A paid job increases the social safety net scale of men (2.3%) a little less than 
the social safety net scale of women (3.6%). This effect probably is partly caused by 
the fact that elderly retired people have fewer friends and family members on whom 
they  can  call  when  necessary.  This  finding  also  suggests  that  people  who  are 
successful in finding a paid job (or employment protection) are also more skillful in 
creating a social safety net for themselves. 
 
Higher  educated  people  have  a  larger  social  network  and  are  more  likely  to  be 
member  of  a  union  or  interest  group.  This  finding  suggests  that  human  capital 
(education) and social capital are complements. This confirms earlier findings that   16 
show that human capital and trust in other people are complements (see Glaeser et. 
al. 2000b).  
A year of education increases the social network by 0.6% - 0.8%. Education 
does not have a statistical significant effect on the extent of the social safety net of 
men. Among women a year of education appears to reduce the social safety net 
scale by 0.6%. 
 
 
Table 6 Parameter estimations Log social safety net (standard errors in 
brackets)  
  All  Men  Women 
Gender  -0.006 (0.006)     
Employed  0.027** (0.007)  0.023** (0.010)  0.036** (0.012) 
Years of education  -0.001 (0.001)  0.001 (0.001)  -0.006** (0.002) 
Log age squared  -0.028* (0.014)  -0.068** (0.023)  -0.017 (0.018) 
Log age  0.216* (0.101)  0.529** (0.169)  0.103 (0.128) 
City   -0.005 (0.007)  -0.018* (0.008)  0.017 (0.012) 
Municipality  -0.014** (0.002)  -0.015** (0.003)  -0.013** (0.004) 
Years in house  0.001** (0.000)  0.001** (0.000)  0.002** (0.001) 
Living together  0.059** (0.008)  0.079** (0.010)  0.026* (0.012) 
Child aged < 4  -0.024* (0.011)  -0.044** (0.014)  0.007 (0.018) 
Child aged 4 - 12  0.057** (0.010)  0.052** (0.012)  0.064** (0.016) 
Child aged 12 -18  0.083** (0.011)  0.073** (0.014)  0.103** (0.018) 
Child aged > 18  0.008 (0.010)  0.006 (0.012)  0.014 (0.016) 
Log household income  -0.001 (0.005)  -0.008 (0.006)  0.011 (0.008) 
Ethnic minority  -0.034* (0.016)  0.004 (0.020)  -0.091** (0.026) 
Conservative  0.017** (0.006)  0.026** (0.007)  -0.002 (0.010) 
Health  0.023** (0.003)  0.019** (0.004)  0.027** (0.005) 
Intercept  2.096** (0.191)  1.527** (0.320)  2.303** (0.243) 
       
Adjusted R
2  0.054  0.056  0.067 
Number of observations  8440  5582  2858 
 
 
Both age variables have a statistically insignificant effect on the size of the social 
network. However, if we only include log age (and exclude log age squared) we find 
that  age  has  a  positive  and  statistically  significant  effect  on  the  log  of  the  social 
network.   17 
Table 7 Parameter estimations probit model membership (standard errors in 
brackets)  
  All  Men  Women 
Gender  0.274** (0.027)     
Employed  0.385 ** (0.034  0.258** (0.045)  0.557** (0.055) 
Years of education  0.029** (0.005)  0.013* (0.006)  0.069** (0.009) 
Log Age squared  0.042 (0.060)  -0.155 (0.096)  0.171* (0.081) 
Log Age  0.222 (0.439)  1.611* (0.716)  -0.568 (0.584) 
City   -0.006 (0.030)  0.010 (0.038)  -0.038 (0.052) 
Municipality  0.002 (0.011)  0.000 (0.013)  0.002 (0.019) 
Years in house  0.001 (0.001)  0.002 (0.001)  -0.003 (0.002) 
Living together  0.047 (0.033)  0.078 (0.045)  -0.041 (0.053) 
Child aged < 4  0.031 (0.048)  0.077 (0.062)  -0.033 (0.078) 
Child aged 4 - 12  -0.057 (0.044)  -0.015 (0.056)  -0.133* (0.074) 
Child aged 12 - 18  0.010 (0.049)  0.153* (0.061)  -0.228** (0.083) 
Child aged > 18  0.009 (0.043)  0.045 (0.054)  -0.074 (0.069) 
Log household income   0.119** (0.021)  0.064* (0.025)  0.241** (0.036) 
Ethnic minority  -0.090 (0.070)  -0.178* (0.089)  0.074 (0.112) 
Conservative  -0.295** (0.025)  -0.313** (0.030)  -0.228** (0.044) 
Health    -0.043** (0.013)  -0.033** (0.016)  -0.060** (0.021) 
Intercept  -3.193** (0.832)  -4.690** (1.359)  -3.454** (1.104) 
       
Pseudo R
2  0.036  0.021  0.063 
Loglikelihood  -7551.308  -5005.000  -2486.106 
Number of observations  11381  7380  4001 
 
 
Age has an inverse U-shaped effect on the log of the social safety net scale. 
The top of the age parabola is around age 50, i.e. until that age the log of the social 
safety net scale increases in age, while after that it starts to decline. The extent of the 
social  safety  net  declines  as  people  get  older.  Elderly  people may  become more 
socially isolated, partly because relatives and friends are deceased or are elderly 
themselves as well and less able to lend social support. It might be expected that the 
need for a social safety net increases with age, as people become more dependent 
on others when they are old. So, the extent of the social safety net decreases when 
the need for one increases. 
Older people are more likely to be a member of a union or interest group. We 
find a statistically significant and positive effect of the variable ‘log age’ for men and 
of ‘log age squared’ for women.    18 
People living in a large city have a smaller social network than those living in a small 
city (or municipality) or at the country side. This can be seen as indicative for the 
greater anonymity and individualism of living in a large city.  
There  are  no  statistically  significant  differences  in  the  size  of  the  social 
network between people in a small village and people in a middle sized municipality. 
The point estimates indicate that there is a 7% difference in the size of the social 
network between people in a large city and people living in a small village. We also 
find that people living in a municipality have a smaller social safety net. Living in a 
middle sized municipality reduces the social safety net scale by 1.5% compared to 
people living in a small village. 
 
Both  the  sizes  of  the  social  network  and  the  social  safety  net  increase  with  the 
number of years people have lived in the same house. A longer stay in the same 
house  and  neighborhood  not  only  increases  the  opportunities  to  build  a  social 
network and a social safety net of people living in the same neighborhood, but a 
lower residential mobility also makes it more attractive to invest in building  this kind  
of social relations. Each year living in the same house increases the size of the social 
network and the social safety net scale by 0.1%. 
 
People who are married or who live together
1 with a partner have more social capital: 
being  married  or  living  together  increases  the  size  of  the  social  network  and  the 
extent of the social safety net. Characteristics that make one more successful on the 
marriage or partner market apparently also increase one’s social capital. 
                                                 
1  In  this  study  we  do  not  differentiate  between  the  formal  marriage  status  and  steady 
partnership without being formally married.   19 
There are some notable differences between men and women in the effect of 
marital status on the social network and the social safety net. For men the effect on 
the size of the social network of being married is much smaller than for women. For 
men being married increases the size of the social safety net by 3.9%, for women this 
is 6.7%. The reverse holds for the effect of being married on the social safety net 
scale. Here the effect on men is larger than for women. Among men being married 
increases the social safety net scale by 7.9%, while among women this is only 2.6%. 
It seems to indicate that superficial social relations are triggered by the male partner 
and that the intensive relations, yielding a social safety net, depend on the female 
partner. Being married or living together does not have a statistically significant effect 
on being a member of a union or special interest group.  
 
The effects of children on social capital is mixed. The presence of young children is 
associated  with  a  larger  social  network  but  a  lower  social  safety  net  scale.  The 
presence of older children is associated with a smaller social network but a higher 
score on the social safety net scale. Children have no statistically significant effect on 
membership of a union or special interest group. 
 
Household income does not have a statistically significant effect on the size of the 
social network, nor on the social safety net scale. Household income does have a 
statistically significant and positive effect, however, on the probability of membership 
of a union or special interest group. 
 
Being a member of an ethnic minority is associated with a lower extent of the social 
safety net. Among men, ethnic minority members are less likely to be a member of a   20 
union  or  special  interest  group.  The  ethnic  minority  variables  do  not  have  a 
statistically significant effect on the size of the social network. 
 
Having conservative political opinions (i.e. people who intend to vote for one of the 
parties belonging to the right side of the political spectre) is associated with a larger 
social network. Men with conservative political opinions also have a higher score on 
the  social  safety  net  scale.  Among  women,  conservative  political  opinions  do  not 
have  a  statistically  significant  effect  on  the  social  safety  net  scale.  People  with 
conservative  opinions  are  further  less  likely  to  be  a  member  of  a  trade  union  or 
association. This is not surprising as conservative individuals are not inclined to join a 
union or association to change the present situation. Conservatives may be expected 
to be more likely to be satisfied with the current situation. 
 
Finally we find that a good health increases the size of the social network and is 
associated  with  a  higher  score  on  the  social  safety  net  scale,  but  lowers  the 
probability  that  one  is  a  member  of  a trade  union  or  association.  A  better  health 
probably enables one to invest in social contacts in the neighborhood and in a social 
safety net, and a healthy person is more attractive for other persons to associate 
with. Apparently, a better health reduces the need for protection by a union or special 
interest group. 
 
   21 
The effects of social participation on life satisfaction 
 
Table 8 contains the parameter estimates of the ordered probit regressions on life 
satisfaction.  Again,  we  present  estimates  for  the  joint  sample  and  for  men  and  
women separately. In the estimates for the entire population we find a statistically 
significant negative effect of gender indicating that men are less satisfied with their 
life than women. 
  With respect to our three indicators of social capital we find for both men and 
women positive and statistically significant effects of the log-size of the social network 
and of the log of the social safety net scale. That is, men and women who have a 
larger social network or whose social safety net is more extensive are more satisfied 
with their  life. Membership of a union or association does not have a statistically 
significant effect on life satisfaction. 
  We  now  briefly  discuss  the  other  findings.  If  we  control  for  education  and 
income,  having  a  paid  job  does  not  have  a  statistically  significant  effect  on  life 
satisfaction. This finding holds for both men and women.  
  For  men  life  satisfaction  increases  with  education  and  the  log  of  age.  For 
women both education and age do not have a statistically significant effect on life 
satisfaction.   
  Being married or living together with a partner increases life satisfaction for 
both men and women. The effects of the presence of children on life satisfaction is 
mixed. For men, the presence of children in the age 4 to 12 years old lowers life 
satisfaction. For women, having children aged 18 or older increases life satisfaction. 
Children  in  other  age  categories  have  a  statistically  non-significant  effect  on  life 
satisfaction.    22 
Table 8 Parameter estimations ordered probit model life satisfaction (standard 
errors in brackets) 
  All  Men  Women 
Gender  -0.103 (0.029)**     
Employed  -0.040 (0.036)  -0.039 (0.047)  -0.003 (0.059) 
Years of education  0.014 (0.005) **  0.014 (0.006) *  0.008 (0.010) 
Log Age squared  0.248 (0.091) **  0.201 (0.098) *  0.547 (0.268) * 
Log Age  -1.573 (0.679) *  -1.144 (0.729)  -3.937 (1.995) * 
City   0.028 (0.031)  0.034 (0.039)  0.015 (0.053) 
Municipality  -0.006 (0.011)  -0.001 (0.014)  -0.019 (0.020) 
Years in house  -0.001 (0.001)  0.001 (0.001)  -0.005 (0.002) * 
Living together  0.479 (0.038) **  0.515 (0.053) **  0.420 (0.058) ** 
Child aged < 4  -0.039 (0.050)  -0.060 (0.063)  0.003 (0.082) 
Child aged 4 – 12  -0.113 (0.045) *  -0.201 (0.057) **  0.044 (0.074) 
Child aged 12 - 18  -0.064 (0.051)  -0.120 (0.064)  0.049 (0.084) 
Child aged > 18  0.094 (0.046) *  0.045 (0.059)  0.161 (0.075) * 
Log household income  0.131 (0.022) **  0.140 (0.027) **  0.111 (0.037) ** 
Ethnic minority  -0.012 (0.076)  0.016 (0.097)  -0.048 (0.122) 
Log social network  0.086 (0.028) **  0.088 (0.034) *  0.093 (0.048) 
Log social safety net  0.412 (0.056) **  0.396 (0.069) **  0.443 (0.096) ** 
Conservative  0.077 (0.026) **  0.072 (0.032) *  0.090 (0.047) 
Member of union or 
association  -0.002 (0.026)  -0.041 (0.031)  0.081 (0.047) 
Health  0.399 (0.014) **  0.413 (0.018) **  0.375 (0.023) ** 
Location parameters 
α1  -1.333 (1.286)  -0.031 (1.386)  -6.188 (3.720) 
α2  -1.110 (1.284)  0.115 (1.385)  -5.801 (3.717) 
α3  -0.812 (1.283)  0.384 (1.384)  -5.264 (3.715) 
α4  -0.353 (1.282)  0.806 (1.383)  -4.804 (3.715) 
α5  0.043 (1.282)  1.163 (1.383)  -4.230 (3.714) 
α6  0.617 (1.282)  1.743 (1.383)  -3.186 (3.714) 
α7  1.705 (1.282)  2.862 (1.383)  -1.735 (3.714) 
α8  3.210 (1.282)  4.397 (1.384)  -0.815 (3.714) 
α9  4.060 (1.282)  5.219 (1.384)   
Pseudo R2  0.069  0.071  0.067 
Loglikelihood  -9354.812  -6142.714  -3187.972 
Number of observations  7139  4769  2370 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level. 
 
 
Men with conservative political opinions have a higher life satisfaction. This can be 
expected as people with conservative opinions are satisfied with the ‘status quo’, 
while people who consider themselves to be ‘progressive’ want change and are less 
satisfied with the current situation.   23 
Finally, we find that both for men and women life satisfaction strongly increases with 
the quality of health. 
 
 
The compensating income variation of social capital 
 
Table 9 contains the equivalence scales (ES) and compensating income variations 
(CV) of social capital. For the entire population in our sample the ES of the size of the 
social network is 1.162. For women the ES of social network is somewhat larger than 
for men, indicating that women attach a higher value to a social network than men 
do. 
  The CV of social capital is calculated by multiplying the equivalence scale by 
the average net household income per month of the respondents in our sample (Euro 
2710). The CV of a one unit increase in the size of the social network is Euro 438 per 
month. At the average level of household income the CV is 415 Euro for men and 
570 Euro for women. 
  The ES of the social safety net scale is 1.328. Again we find a larger ES for 
women than for men. For women the ES is 1.434 while it is 1.290 for men. At the 
average level of household income this corresponds to a CV of a unit change on the 
social safety net scale of 787 Euro for men and 1176 Euro for women. 
  The ES of membership of a union or association is 0.982. For a respondent 
with an average monthly income this corresponds to a cost of membership of 50 Euro 
per  month.  It  should  be  kept  in  mind,  however,  that  none  of  the  coefficients  of 
membership of a union or association is statistically different from zero. Further, the 
decision  for  membership  is  endogenous  and  it  is  quite  probable  that  for  non-  24 
members the value of membership is much less than for members and consequently 
they have chosen for non-membership.   
 
 
Table  9  The  equivalence  scales  and  the  compensating  income  variations  of 
social cohesion  
  Social network  Social safety 
net 
Membership of union 
or association 
All 
Equivalence scale  1.162  1.328  0.982 
Compensating income 
 variation (in euros) 
438  889  -50 
Men 
Equivalence scale  1.153  1.290  0.749 
Compensating income  
variation (in euros) 
415  787  -681 
Women 
Equivalence scale  1.211  1.434  2.076 
Compensating income 
 variation (in euros) 
570  1176  3116 
The compensating income variation is calculated in the average net monthly household income of the 






Most  empirical  studies  have  used  a  measure  of  trust  or  membership  of  clubs  or 
organizations to measure social capital. In this paper we have used some different 
measures: the size of the social network, the extent of the social safety net, and 
membership of a union or association. Our findings on the determinants of social 
capital in some respects confirm those of earlier studies. Other findings cannot be 
replicated using our definition of social capital. Earlier studies for example found that 
gender, ethnic origin and economic success have an effect on trust in one’s fellow 
men. In our study we do not find statistically significant effects of gender, ethnic origin 
or household income on the size of the social network or the extent of the social   25 
safety net. Other results, however, are confirmed by our findings. Like in previous 
studies we find that a higher education and being married or cohabiting is positively 
associated with social capital. 
 
A second objective of this paper was to quantify the effect of social capital as defined 
above on life satisfaction. Does more social capital make people more satisfied with 
their life? We find that there is a significant correlation between social capital and life 
satisfaction.  Reluctantly  we  assume  a  causality  relationship,  where  having  social 
capital increases life satisfaction, although the link may also be interpreted inversely. 
As individuals are more satisfied with life, they will be nicer company for others and 
consequently have more friends and relations.  However, there is no doubt that social 
capital  affects  life  satisfaction  quite  considerably.  This  is  illustrated  by  the 
compensating income variation of the three measures of social capital. 
The compensating variation of social capital in terms of money is sizeable. 
This suggests that people attach a high value to social capital indicators as the size 
of their social network and the extent of their social safety net. 
In this paper we analyzed the effect of social capital in various forms on life 
satisfaction. Although we are fully aware that there are many facets of social capital 
that we have not adequately covered by the three indicators at our disposal, we have 
found  unmistakable  indications  for  the  importance  of  social  capital  for  life.  26 
References 
 
Alesina, A. & W. La Ferrara (2000), ‘The determinants of trust’, NBER Working Paper 
7621 
 
Arrow, K. (1999), ‘Observations on social capital’, in: P. Dasgupta & I. Serageldin 
(eds.), Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective, Washington, The Worldbank, p. 3-
5 
 
Beckie, T. & L. Hayduk (1997), ‘Measuring quality of life’, Social Indicators Research 
42, p. 21-39 
 
Bourdieu, P. (1986), ‘Forms of capital’, in: J. Richardson (ed.), Handbook of Theory 
and Research for the Sociology of Education, Greenwood Press, Westport, p. 241-
260 
 
Diener, E. (1984), ‘Subjective well-being’, Psychological Bulletin 95, p. 542-575 
       
Diener,  E.  &  E.  Suh  (1997),  ‘Measuring  quality  of  life:  economic,  social,  and 
subjective indicators’, Social Indicators Research 40, p. 189-216 
 
Diener, E. & E. Shuh (1999), ‘National differences in subjective well-being’, in: D. 
Kahneman  &  N.  Schwarz  (eds.),  Well-being:  The  Foundations  of  Hedonic 
Psychology, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, p. 434-450 
 
Durlauf, S. (1999), ‘the case against social capital’, Focus 20, p. 1-4 
 
Durlauf, S. (2002), ‘Bowling alone: a review essay’, Journal of Economic Behavior 
and Organization 47, p. 259-273 
 
Durlauf, S. & M. Fafchamps (2004), ‘Social Capital’, Working Paper, NBER working 
paper 10485 
 
Fukuyama, F. (1995), Trust, Free Press, New York 
 
Fukuyama, F. (1999), The Great Disruption: Human Nature And The Reconstitution 
of Social Order, Profile Books, London 
 
Glaeser, E., D. Laibson, J. Scheinkman & C. Soutter (1999), ‘What is social capital? 
The determinants of trust and antitrust’, NBER Working Paper 7216 
 
Glaeser,  E.,  D.  Laibson,  J.  Scheinkman  &  C.  Soutter  (2000a),  ‘Measuring  trust’, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, p. 811-846 
 
Glaeser, E., D. Laibson & B. Sacerdote (2000b), ‘The economic approach to social 
capital’, NBER Working Paper 7728 
 
Groot, W. & H. Maassen van den Brink (2000), ‘Life-satisfaction and preference drift’, 
Social Indicators Research 50, p. 315-328   27 
 
Groot, W. & H. Maassen van den Brink (2003), ‘Sympathy and the value of health: 
the  spill-over  effects  of  migraine  on  household  well-being’,  Social  Indicators 
Research 61, p. 97-120 
 
Groot, W. & H. Maassen van den Brink (2004), ‘A direct method for estimating the 
compensating income variation for severe headache and migraine’, Social Science 
and Medicine 58, p. 305-314 
 
Helliwell, J. & R. Putnam (1999), ‘Education and social capital’, NBER Working Paper 
7121 
 
Knack,  S.  &  P.  Keefer  (1997),  ‘Does  social  capital  have  an  economic  payoff?  A 
cross-country investigation’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, p. 1251-1288 
 
McIntosh, C. (2001), ‘Report on the construct validity of the temporal satisfaction with 
life scale’, Social Indicators Research 54, p. 37-61 
 
McKelvey, R. & W. Zavoina (1975), ‘A statistical model for the analysis of ordinal 
level dependent variables’, Journal of Mathematical Sociology 4, p. 103-120 
 
Putnam, R. (1995), ‘The case of missing social capital’, mimeo 
 
Putnam,  R.  (2000),  Bowling  Alone:  The  Collapse  and  Revival  of  American 
Community, Simon & Schuster, New York 
 
Sobel, J. (2002), ‘Can we trust social capital’, Journal of Economic Literature 40, p. 
139-154 
 
Solow,  R.  (1999),  ‘Notes  on  social  capital  and  economic  performance’,  in:  P. 
Dasgupta  &  I.  Serageldin  (eds.),  Social  Capital:  A  Multifaceted  Perspective, 
Washington, The Worldbank, p. 6-10 
 
Van Praag, B. & A. Ferrer-I-Carbonell (2002), ‘The subjective costs of health losses 
due  to  chronic  diseases:  an  alternative  model  for  monetary  appraisal’,  Health 
Economics 11, p. 709-722 
 
Van Praag, B., P. Frijters & A. Ferrer-I-Carbonell (2003), ‘The anatomy of subjective 
well-being’, Journal of Economics Behavior and Organization 51, p. 29-49 
 
Veenhoven,  R.  (1996),  ‘Developments  in  satisfaction  research’,  Social  Indicators 
Research 37, p. 1-46 
 
Woolcock,  M.  (2000),  ‘The  place  of  social  capital  in  understanding  social  and 
economic outcomes’, The World Bank 
 CESifo Working Paper Series 




1828 Eytan Sheshinski, Longevity and Aggregate Savings, October 2006 
 
1829 Momi Dahan and Udi Nisan, Low Take-up Rates: The Role of Information, October 
2006 
 
1830 Dieter Urban, Multilateral Investment Agreement in a Political Equilibrium, October 
2006 
 
1831 Jan Bouckaert and Hans Degryse, Opt In Versus Opt Out: A Free-Entry Analysis of 
Privacy Policies, October 2006 
 
1832 Wolfram F. Richter, Taxing Human Capital Efficiently: The Double Dividend of 
Taxing Non-qualified Labour more Heavily than Qualified Labour, October 2006 
 
1833 Alberto Chong and Mark Gradstein, Who’s Afraid of Foreign Aid? The Donors’ 
Perspective, October 2006 
 
1834 Dirk Schindler, Optimal Income Taxation with a Risky Asset – The Triple Income Tax, 
October 2006 
 
1835 Andy Snell and Jonathan P. Thomas, Labour Contracts, Equal Treatment and Wage-
Unemployment Dynamics, October 2006 
 
1836 Peter Backé and Cezary Wójcik, Catching-up and Credit Booms in Central and Eastern 
European EU Member States and Acceding Countries: An Interpretation within the 
New Neoclassical Synthesis Framework, October 2006 
 
1837 Lars P. Feld, Justina A.V. Fischer and Gebhard Kirchgaessner, The Effect of Direct 
Democracy on Income Redistribution: Evidence for Switzerland, October 2006 
 
1838 Michael Rauscher, Voluntary Emission Reductions, Social Rewards, and Environmental 
Policy, November 2006 
 
1839 Vincent Vicard, Trade, Conflicts, and Political Integration: the Regional Interplays, 
November 2006 
 
1840 Erkki Koskela and Mikko Puhakka, Stability and Dynamics in an Overlapping 
Generations Economy under Flexible Wage Negotiation and Capital Accumulation, 
November 2006 
 
1841 Thiess Buettner, Michael Overesch, Ulrich Schreiber and Georg Wamser, Taxation and 




1842 Guglielmo Maria Caporale and Alexandros Kontonikas, The Euro and Inflation 
Uncertainty in the European Monetary Union, November 2006 
 
1843 Jan K. Brueckner and Ann G. Largey, Social Interaction and Urban Sprawl, November 
2006 
 
1844 Eytan Sheshinski, Differentiated Annuities in a Pooling Equilibrium, November 2006 
 
1845 Marc Suhrcke and Dieter Urban, Are Cardiovascular Diseases Bad for Economic 
Growth?, November 2006 
 
1846 Sam Bucovetsky and Andreas Haufler, Preferential Tax Regimes with Asymmetric 
Countries, November 2006 
 
1847 Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite, Should Courts always Enforce 
what Contracting Parties Write?, November 2006 
 
1848 Katharina Sailer, Searching the eBay Marketplace, November 2006 
 
1849 Paul De Grauwe and Pablo Rovira Kaltwasser, A Behavioral Finance Model of the 
Exchange Rate with Many Forecasting Rules, November 2006 
 
1850 Doina Maria Radulescu and Michael Stimmelmayr, ACE vs. CBIT: Which is Better for 
Investment and Welfare?, November 2006 
 
1851 Guglielmo Maria Caporale and Mario Cerrato, Black Market and Official Exchange 
Rates: Long-Run Equilibrium and Short-Run Dynamics, November 2006 
 
1852 Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli and Andrew Postlewaite, Active Courts and Menu 
Contracts, November 2006 
 
1853 Andreas Haufler, Alexander Klemm and Guttorm Schjelderup, Economic Integration 
and Redistributive Taxation: A Simple Model with Ambiguous Results, November 
2006 
 
1854 S. Brock Blomberg, Thomas DeLeire and Gregory D. Hess, The (After) Life-Cycle 
Theory of Religious Contributions, November 2006 
 
1855 Albert Solé-Ollé and Pilar Sorribas-Navarro, The Effects of Partisan Alignment on the 
Allocation of Intergovernmental Transfers. Differences-in-Differences Estimates for 
Spain, November 2006 
 
1856 Biswa N. Bhattacharyay, Understanding the Latest Wave and Future Shape of Regional 
Trade and Cooperation Agreements in Asia, November 2006 
 
1857 Matz Dahlberg, Eva Mörk, Jørn Rattsø and Hanna Ågren, Using a Discontinuous Grant 
to Identify the Effect of Grants on Local Taxes and Spending, November 2006 
 
1858 Ernesto Crivelli and Klaas Staal, Size and Soft Budget Constraints, November 2006 
  
1859 Jens Brøchner, Jesper Jensen, Patrik Svensson and Peter Birch Sørensen, The Dilemmas 
of Tax Coordination in the Enlarged European Union, November 2006 
 
1860 Marcel Gérard, Reforming the Taxation of Multijurisdictional Enterprises in Europe, 
“Coopetition” in a Bottom-up Federation, November 2006 
 
1861 Frank Blasch and Alfons J. Weichenrieder, When Taxation Changes the Course of the 
Year – Fiscal Year Adjustments and the German Tax Reform 2000/2001, November 
2006 
 
1862 Hans Jarle Kind, Tore Nilssen and Lars Sørgard, Competition for Viewers and 
Advertisers in a TV Oligopoly, November 2006 
 
1863 Bart Cockx, Stéphane Robin and Christian Goebel, Income Support Policies for Part-
Time Workers: A Stepping-Stone to Regular Jobs? An Application to Young Long-
Term Unemployed Women in Belgium, December 2006 
 
1864 Sascha O. Becker and Marc-Andreas Muendler, The Effect of FDI on Job Separation, 
December 2006 
 
1865 Christos Kotsogiannis and Robert Schwager, Fiscal Equalization and Yardstick 
Competition, December 2006 
 
1866 Mikael Carlsson, Stefan Eriksson and Nils Gottfries, Testing Theories of Job Creation: 
Does Supply Create Its Own Demand?, December 2006 
 
1867 Jacques H. Drèze, Charles Figuières and Jean Hindriks, Voluntary Matching Grants Can 
Forestall Social Dumping, December 2006 
 
1868 Thomas Eichner and Marco Runkel, Corporate Income Taxation of Multinationals and 
Unemployment, December 2006 
 
1869 Balázs Égert, Central Bank Interventions, Communication and Interest Rate Policy in 
Emerging European Economies, December 2006 
 
1870 John Geweke, Joel Horowitz and M. Hashem Pesaran, Econometrics: A Bird’s Eye 
View, December 2006 
 
1871 Hans Jarle Kind, Marko Koethenbuerger and Guttorm Schjelderup, Taxation in Two-
Sided Markets, December 2006 
 
1872 Hans Gersbach and Bernhard Pachl, Cake Division by Majority Decision, December 
2006 
 
1873 Gunther Schnabl, The Evolution of the East Asian Currency Baskets – Still Undisclosed 
and Changing, December 2006 
 
1874 Horst Raff and Michael J. Ryan, Firm-Specific Characteristics and the Timing of 
Foreign Direct Investment Projects, December 2006 
  
1875 Jukka Pirttilä and Håkan Selin, How Successful is the Dual Income Tax? Evidence from 
the Finnish Tax Reform of 1993, December 2006 
 
1876 Agnieszka Stążka, Sources of Real Exchange Rate Fluctuations in Central and Eastern 
Europe – Temporary or Permanent?, December 2006 
 
1877 Xavier Calsamiglia, Teresa Garcia-Milà and Therese J. McGuire, Why do Differences 
in the Degree of Fiscal Decentralization Endure?, December 2006 
 
1878 Natacha Gilson, How to be Well Shod to Absorb Shocks? Shock Synchronization and 
Joining the Euro Zone, December 2006 
 
1879 Scott Alan Carson, Modern Health Standards for Peoples of the Past: Biological 
Conditions by Race in the American South, 1873 – 1919, December 2006 
 
1880 Peter Huber, Michael Pfaffermayr and Yvonne Wolfmayr, Are there Border Effects in 
the EU Wage Function?, December 2006 
 
1881 Harry Flam and Håkan Nordström, Euro Effects on the Intensive and Extensive Margins 
of Trade, December 2006 
 
1882 Panu Poutvaara and Mikael Priks, Hooliganism in the Shadow of the 9/11 Terrorist 
Attack and the Tsunami: Do Police Reduce Group Violence?, December 2006 
 
1883 Ruud A. de Mooij and Gaëtan Nicodème, Corporate Tax Policy, Entrepreneurship and 
Incorporation in the EU, December 2006 
 
1884 Johannes Becker and Clemens Fuest, Corporate Tax Policy and International Mergers 
and Acquisitions – Is the Tax Exemption System Superior?, January 2007 
 
1885 Momi Dahan and Udi Nisan, The Effect of Benefits Level on Take-up Rates: Evidence 
from a Natural Experiment, January 2007 
 
1886 José García-Solanes, Francisco I. Sancho-Portero and Fernando Torrejón-Flores, 
Beyond the Salassa-Samuelson Effect in some New Member States of the European 
Union, January 2007 
 
1887 Peter Egger, Wolfgang Eggert and Hannes Winner, Saving Taxes Through Foreign 
Plant Ownership, January 2007 
 
1888 Timothy J. Goodspeed and Andrew Haughwout, On the Optimal Design of Disaster 
Insurance in a Federation, January 2007 
 
1889 Wim Groot, Henriëtte Maassen van den Brink and Bernard van Praag, The 
Compensating Income Variation of Social Capital, January 2007 